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ABSTRACT: In a series of recent experimental philosophy articles, Florian Cova and colleagues have 
cast doubt on the existence of a traditional tension that aestheticians since Hume and Kant have noted 
in our aesthetic judgements and practices, viz. the paradox of taste. We argue that Cova et al. 
misrepresent the way in which the aesthetics tradition has conceived the paradox of taste, and question 





A fundamental question in aesthetics is whether aesthetic judgments are subjective or not.1 One 
of the major pieces of evidence to answer that question has traditionally been taken to be what 
the majority of people say and do concerning aesthetic matters. In particular, one major tension 
has been noticed: on the one hand, taste seems proverbially described as something subjectively 
valid (de gustibus non disputandum est, chacun à son goût, sobre gustos no hay nada escrito...) and, on the 
other hand, people seem to treat taste judgements as if they were not merely subjective; in 
particular, they engage in disputes, defer to experts or discard certain views as absurd.  
Statements of this tension can be found at least since Hume and Kant. Thus, In “Of the 
Standard of Taste”, Hume famously formulates the tension thus: 
 
[T]he proverb has justly determined it to be fruitless to dispute concerning tastes. [...]  
But though this axiom, by passing into a proverb, seems to have attained the sanction of 
common sense; there is certainly a species of common sense which opposes it […] 
 
1 Zangwill (2001) even calls this “the Big Question of aesthetics”. 
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Whoever would assert an equality of genius and elegance between OGILBY and 
MILTON, or BUNYAN and ADDISON, would be thought to defend no less an 
extravagance, than if he had maintained a mole-hill to be as high as TENERIFFE (Hume 
1757/1777, Mil 230–231). 
 
Similarly, Kant contrasts two commonplaces of taste: 
 
As regards the Pleasant every one is content that his judgement […] should be limited 
merely to his own person. [However,] if he gives out anything as beautiful, he supposes 
in others the same satisfaction—he judges not merely for himself, but for every one, and 
speaks of beauty as if it were a property of things. (Kant 1790, §7) 
 
More recently, Crispin Sartwell (2017) writes in his Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
entry on “Beauty”: 
 
Taste is proverbially subjective: de gustibus non est disputandum (about taste there is no 
disputing). On the other hand, we do frequently dispute about matters of taste, and some 
persons are held up as exemplars of good taste or of tastelessness. Some people’s tastes 
appear vulgar or ostentatious, for example. Some people’s taste is too exquisitely refined, 
while that of others is crude, naive, or non-existent. Taste, that is, appears to be both 
subjective and objective. 
 
This tension which, following Korsmeyer (1990/2019) among others,2 we will call ‘the paradox 
of taste’, has been taken to be evidence for, as well as a spur to the fundamental question about 
the nature of aesthetic judgments, since an answer to it is taken to be by no means obvious. 
Aesthetics has so far debated at length what explanation to give of the tension, and whether and 
how it supports an answer to the fundamental question. But the existence of the tension itself has 
often been taken for granted. 
Recently, however, Cova et al. (2019), building up on Cova and Pain’s (2012) results, 
 
2 Other names for the same tension exist. Sartwell (2017) for instance calls it “the antinomy of taste”, 
following Kant’s name for his own formulation of the tension. 
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have questioned the existence of this tension by means of a series of experiments. Their results 
show that a vast majority of people, across different cultures, endorse claims that support 
aesthetic subjectivism. In their view, this demonstrates that “the traditional way of approaching 
the debate over the nature of aesthetic judgement is fundamentally misguided” (335) and that 
“philosophical inquiries about the nature of aesthetic judgments should no longer take the 
(explicit) belief in intersubjective validity (and how to explain it) as a starting point” (337). In this 
paper, however, we present some reasons to be sceptical of Cova et al.’s conclusion. 
In §1 we will argue that Cova et al. misrepresent the way in which the aesthetics tradition 
has conceived the paradox of taste. In §2 we show that the paradox can be conceptualized along 
three distinct axes. In §3, we argue that Cova et al.’s tests do not provide relevant evidence under 
any of those three conceptualizations of the tension. In §4, we consider a fourth conceptualization 
of the tension that might be seen as more favourable to Cova et al.’s tests. In §5 we discuss a more 
recent article co-authored by Cova which presents new evidence apparently in tension with 
Cova’s earlier contributions. We show that even this latter case fails to do justice to the aesthetics 
tradition or to provide evidence that calls it into question. 
 
 
1. The Tradition 
 
In large part, the aesthetics literature on the paradox of taste has not taken explicit beliefs in 
intersubjective validity as the main evidence for the existence of the paradox of taste. Indeed, the 
texts that Cova et al. themselves cite to support their interpretation of the aesthetics debate do 
not show that aestheticians give much weight to folk’s explicit belief in intersubjective validity. 
As a matter of fact, even some of the texts Cova et al. cite say something different. 
For example, Cova et al. (2019) cite the following passage from a prominent recent 
aesthetician: 
 
Both realism and non-realism are on a par as far as the experiential aspect of aesthetics is 
concerned. But when it comes to explaining the normativity of aesthetic judgements, the 
realist is ahead […] I conclude that folk aesthetics is thus realist. Whether or not the tacit 
folk metaphysical commitment to aesthetic facts or states of affair is justified is another matter, 
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but our aesthetic judgments presuppose that metaphysics. What is not an option is holding 
some non-realist view, be it Humean, Kantian or dispositional, while we can 
unproblematically retain our ordinary practice of making aesthetic judgments (Zangwill 
2001; cit. in Cova, 321–22; our emphases). 
 
Here Zangwill is pointing out an advantage of realism, and hence intersubjectivism about aesthetic 
judgements. His starting point is the folk’s “ordinary practice of making aesthetic judgements”. 
This folk practice, he suggests, is committed to the existence of aesthetic facts, and hence is 
unproblematically in accord with realism. However, as he clearly points out, such a folk 
commitment is “tacit”. That, he claims, is the metaphysics that “our aesthetic judgements 
presuppose”.3 
Next, Cova et al. (2019) quote Noël Carroll as saying: 
 
The supposition that aesthetic properties are objective also explains better how we talk 
about them than does the projection theory. For example, people involved in disputes 
about aesthetic properties act as though they think that they are disagreeing about the real 
properties of objects. They behave as though they think that there is a fact of the matter to 
be determined. They speak as if one side of the disagreement is right and the other wrong. 
(Carroll 1999; cit. in Cova et al. 2019, 322; our emphases) 
 
Like Zangwill, Carroll does not take “the (explicit) belief in intersubjective validity’’ as a starting 
point. He starts from the consideration that, in talking about aesthetic properties, people “act” in 
certain ways: e.g. they get involved in disputes. From this fact he draws the conclusion that they 
“must believe that aesthetic properties are objective”. This, however, is the conclusion of an 
argument to the best explanation, rather than one of its premises. The important premise of such 
an argument is that people engage in a certain kind of “behaviour”. 
Cova and Pain (2012) also argue that aestheticians should not have assumed that the folk 
are intersubjectivists. Indeed, they use some of the same quotations including Zangwill’s and 
Carroll’s just quoted. They also quote the following from another contemporary aesthetician: 
 




[Aesthetic Realism]’s views belong to folk metaphysics: there is no attempt to set a new 
ontological partition, purportedly clearer, more accurate, or more convenient, for our 
way to conceptualize reality; rather, it is an attempt to explain the implicit ontology in 
our ordinary aesthetic ascriptions and our most common aesthetic practice. (Réhault 
2009; cit. in Cova and Pain 2012, 260) 
 
Once more, Réhault here is not claiming that the folk hold explicit beliefs in the intersubjective 
validity of aesthetics judgements, but that folk behaviour is “implicit[ly]” committed to 
intersubjectivism. As these three examples illustrate, the paradox of taste is not a tension between 
explicit beliefs in subjectivism and explicit beliefs in intersubjectivism. 
 
 
2. Three Distinct Axes 
 
Before examining Cova et al.’s experiments in more detail, it is worth noting that the quotes 
previously cited from Zangwill, Carroll and Réhault exemplify another recurrent feature in the 
traditional understanding of the paradox of taste, i.e. the alignment between explicitness and 
beliefs, on the one hand, and implicitness and behaviours on the other. In other words, the 
aesthetics tradition observes the subjectivist viewpoint mainly in explicitly avowed beliefs. By 
contrast, the objectivist or intersubjectivist viewpoint is mainly seen as residing more implicitly 
in patterns of behaviour.4 Consider for instance this recent characterization of the paradox of taste: 
 
Two common observations about aesthetics are in tension: that people generally consider 
aesthetic judgments subjective, and that people generally behave like objectivists (arguing 
over judgments, making choices based on judgments of trusted critics, rejecting strong 
assertions of aesthetic equivalence). (Rabb et al. 2020, 1) 
 
 
4 In later passages, both Cova and Pain (2012) and Cova et al. (2019) briefly mention the tension between 
beliefs and behaviour as a possible alternative to the paradox of taste. What they do not acknowledge is 
that this tension is in fact the paradox of taste itself as it has been understood by the aesthetics tradition. 
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These two conceptualizations of the paradox of taste—along belief/behaviour and 
explicit/implicit axes—are clearly connected. But they are nevertheless different, and it is best 
to distinguish them, for the appeal to implicit beliefs is an attempt to explain the way in which 
people behave, what they say when they interact with others or when they disagree with others’ 
aesthetic judgments. Thus, Carroll concludes his (previously mentioned) description of folks’ 
aesthetic behaviour as follows: 
 
So, they, at least, must believe that aesthetic properties are objective. That is the way of 
understanding their behaviour that renders it most intelligible. On the other hand, if disputants 
are simply trading projections, we would have to say that their behaviour is ultimately 
irrational. (Carroll 1999, 117; our emphases) 
 
Finally, it is important to note that the paradox of taste can also be conceived as a contrast 
between people’s aesthetic judgements/practices and people’s judgments/practices when they 
reflect about situations in which disagreements concerning aesthetic judgments or practices are at 
stake. When reflecting about aesthetic discussion and disagreements, people often wax 
subjectivist (or so the tradition in aesthetics assumes), endorsing the proverbial “de gustibus non 
disputandum est” or “to each their own”. Such judgments are about aesthetic judgments and about 
aesthetic disputes; they are, in an important sense, meta-aesthetic and sometimes their subjectivist 
tone may contrast with the things that people do and say when they are immersed in the situations 
in which they engage in arguments as to, say, whether something is or is not beautiful. But this 
may be the case even at the level of fully explicit beliefs. 
 
 
3. The Experiments 
 
Building up on the model set by Cova and Pain (2012), Cova et al. set out to test 2,392 
participants in nineteen countries across four continents. The participants were invited to 
describe something that they find very beautiful and imagine someone disagreeing with them. 
Then, they were asked to choose one among the following three options, specifying how certain 
they are of their responses: 
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1. One of you is correct while the other is not. 
2. Both of you are correct. 
3. Neither is correct. It makes no sense to talk about correctness in this situation. (Cova 
at al., 2019, 324) 
 
Their results show that an underwhelming number of people (7%) answer 1. Since the 
endorsement of the subjectivity of aesthetic judgments is very robust, Cova et al. conclude that 
the traditionally postulated paradox of taste does not exist. 
Cova et al. ask participants to choose among competing explicit beliefs (or avowals of 
belief) about aesthetic judgments (whether two people who disagree in their aesthetic assessment 
can both be right, whether one of them has to be wrong or whether it makes no sense to adjudicate 
in these matters). By contrast, as earlier indicated, the issue, as it has been traditionally 
understood in aesthetics, does not concern a tension between folk’s explicit endorsement of dicta 
such as de gustibus non disputandum est and their explicit beliefs in intersubjectivism. The problem 
that aestheticians consider most puzzling, instead, is that people declare to agree with a statement, 
and then they go on to do and say things that are not in line with what they explicitly endorsed. 
Cova et al.’s experiments do, at most, confirm what aestheticians already knew: that people 
explicitly endorse the claim of subjectivism. 
So, Cova et al.’s tests are not sufficient to show that the paradox of taste, as traditionally 
understood in aesthetics, does not exist. In general, one cannot infer from someone’s explicit 
avowals that they will behave according to them. For example, it is well established that many 
people endorse explicitly non-racist beliefs, and yet they behave as if they believed the opposite 
by, e.g., not taking into further consideration the CVs of candidates with ‘black-sounding’ names 
(such as ‘Jamal’ or ‘Lakisha’), even when they have the same qualifications as candidates with 
‘white-sounding’ names such as ‘Emily’ or ‘Greg’.5 If Cova et al. (2019)’s strategy was applied 
to this case, we would have to conclude that such people were not racist. But that would be 
absurd. 
 
5 See Bertrand & Mullainathan (2004) and Kelly & Roedder (2008), “Racial Recognition and the Ethics of 
Implicit Bias”, Philosophy Compass 3, 522–544. For these and other cases of “fragmented mind”, see Borgoni 
et al. (2021). 
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To sum up, if one conceptualizes the paradox of taste along the belief/behaviour axis, 
showing that the tension suggested by the paradox does not exist would require showing that the 
folk behave in a subjectivist way. However, Cova et al.’s experiments primarily test the folks’ 
beliefs rather than their behaviours. If one instead conceptualizes the paradox along the 
explicit/implicit axis, showing that the tension does not exist would require showing that the folk 
hold implicit subjectivist beliefs. But the experiments under discussion primarily test folks’ 
explicit beliefs. Finally, if the paradox is conceptualized along the meta-aesthetic/aesthetic axis, 
showing that the tension does not exist would require showing that the folk 
make aesthetic statements in a subjectivist fashion. However, Cova et al.’s experiments primarily 
test folks’ meta-aesthetic avowals, rather than their first-order aesthetic judgements. 
We are left with the conclusion that Cova et al. (2019)’s tests do not show that the 
tension, as traditionally understood in aesthetics, does not exist. Neither do they show that there 
is anything radically wrong, in this respect, with the traditional aesthetics approach. In what 




4. A Fourth Axis 
 
As we have pointed out, the paradox of taste has its roots in Hume’s description of what he 
considers as a tension in “common sense”. However, Hume’s original formulation of the paradox 
of taste can be interpreted in various different ways. One of these may be sufficiently friendly to 
Cova et al.’s understanding of the problem to be used to resist our arguments against them so far. 
On this rather literal interpretation, the relevant tension is between the subjectivist belief that it 
is “fruitless to dispute concerning taste” and the intersubjectivist belief that “[w]hoever would 
assert an equality of genius and elegance between OGILBY and MILTON, or BUNYAN and 
ADDISON, would be thought to defend no less an extravagance, than if he had maintained a 
molehill to be as high as TENERIFFE”. The subjectivist belief is meant to apply generally to all 
cases (as in the proverb), whilst intersubjectivist beliefs apply only insofar as we consider particular 
cases (such as the works of particular poets).6 
 
6This understanding may be traced back to suggestions contained in Korsmeyer (1990/2019), 98. 
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If one understands the paradox of taste in the way just suggested, then one may see it as a 
conflict between explicit beliefs. From this perspective, one might be tempted to conclude that 
Cova et al.’s experiments challenge Hume’s claim that the folk hold intersubjectivist beliefs about 
particular cases, and hence the existence of a paradox. For example, if a participant in Cova et al. 
(2019)’s experiment describes a poem by Milton that she finds very beautiful, and imagines 
someone else stating that Ogilby is a better poet than Milton, then Hume’s prediction seems to 
be that that participant will conclude that the other person is wrong. By contrast, the experiment 
shows that she will not reach that conclusion (i.e. she will not choose Cova et al. 2019’s Response 
1). 
However, this interpretation of Hume is not obviously the correct one. As we have seen 
in Section 1, many aestheticians have understood Hume as focusing instead on a contrast between 
implicit commitments to intersubjectivism and explicit belief in subjectivism. Moreover, even if 
this were the correct interpretation, it would be an interpretation that only applies to Hume. 
Kant and various other subsequent aestheticians have seen the paradox of taste in a different way. 
As we have argued earlier, the paradox is typically understood to be mainly about the tension 
between tacit or implicit intersubjectivist commitments vs. explicit subjectivist beliefs, rather than 
about the tension between explicit intersubjectivist beliefs about particular cases vs. explicit 
subjectivist beliefs that hold in general. As a consequence, it is not fair to say, as Cova et al. do, 
that the tension endorsed by the aesthetics tradition does not exist. 
 
 
5. A Conversion?  
 
More recently, Cova has co-authored a new experimental article (Bonard et al. forthcoming), 
which might be construed as in tension with the earlier contributions discussed so far. This new 
paper sets out to probe folks’ opinions on the distinction between good and bad taste. What the 
paper reports finding is that most people accept there is good and bad taste and that taste can be 
improved. At the same time, they are almost 50-50 split between subjectivist and objectivist 
understandings of what taste is.7 The authors of the paper conclude that, far from being a figment 
 
7Similar results were reached in a recent survey of philosophers’ impressions: 
https://survey2020.philpeople.org. Among other things, the results speak against a divide between folk 
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of aestheticians’ imagination, the paradox of taste is still present today. 
This conclusion is more in line with what we have been arguing. However, Bonard et al.’s 
argument to that conclusion still risks not doing justice to the aesthetics tradition. As we have 
been arguing, the conflict between subjectivist and objectivist tendencies that the aesthetics 
tradition typically observes is to a good approximation expressed in terms of explicit vs implicit 
attitudes. These are intrapersonal conflicting attitudes held by the same judgers. At least 
immediately, however, Bonard et al.’s results suggest instead a mere interpersonal split between 
two different sets of participants, i.e. those who express subjectivist, and those who express 
objectivist, understandings of taste.8 
This flaw in the way they interpret their results notwithstanding, Bonard et al.’s results 
are not incompatible with traditional observations in aesthetics. The nature of the relevant 
questions they ask of participants are in fact compatible with more explicit or implicit readings. 
Experimental participants are first asked the following question: 
 
When we speak of people’s preferences about works of art (such as novels, paintings, 
music, songs, movies, TV shows, etc.), we sometimes make a difference between people 
who have “good taste” and those who have “bad taste”. 
 
Has it ever happened to you to say or think that a certain person had better taste than 
another one in this sense? (YES/NO) (5) 
 
If they answer ‘yes’, then they are asked the following set of additional questions: 
 
What do you mean when you say that someone has good taste? Please, explain in a few 
sentences. [...] 
 
What do you mean when you say that someone has bad taste? Please, explain in a few 
 
and philosophical impressions on this topic. 







Can you think of a person who, according to you, has good taste? Describe in a few 
sentences why you think this person has good taste. [...] 
 
Can you think of a person who, according to you, has bad (or poor) taste? Describe in a 
few sentences why you think this person has poor taste. (6) 
 
However, such questions, especially when asked as a set, can be interpreted in different 
ways depending on the emphasis each participant gives to each question, or component thereof. 
On the one hand, the questions ask participants to elaborate their views about taste in quite 
explicit and general ways. On the other hand, the questions also touch on more operational 
aspects of taste than the questions Cova et al. asked in earlier papers. Whereas the latter asked 
whether disagreement about taste was to be interpreted in an objectivist or subjectivist sense, 
Bonard et al.’s four questions, (a) ask participants to explain their own use of words (“What do 
you mean when you say”), and (b) ask them to describe examples that illustrate the distinction 
between good and bad taste. These latter two aspects of Bonard et al.’s questioning can be 
construed as ways of articulating in more explicit ways behaviours of aesthetic judgement that are 
more often undertaken on a more implicit level. These different aspects of Bonard et al.’s 
experimental setting make their questions more ambiguous between the explicit and implicit sides 
of the paradox of taste, than was the case with Cova et al.’s earlier experiments. This in turn can 
cause the split between subjectivism and objectivism in their results. 
We conclude that the features of the experimental settings of the three papers discussed 
fall short of establishing folks’ views on the validity of aesthetic judgements, as they fail to 
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